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Summarizing The Battle of Cold Harbor, Charles Calrow in July 1933 penned, “There is no denying that Cold Harbor was unparallel Federal disaster. It was also the last chance for General Lee to stop General Grant’s relentless drive on the Confederate capital.”

Using the intellectual vehicle of a Staff Ride, begun by the Prussian Army and latter used by our own Army as a means for educating our officers, we will explore The Battle for Cold Harbor in terms of Military Science for conveying historical lessons, involving the nine Principles of War, defined in the Army Field Manual, FM-3 Military Operations. 1) Massing and concentrating, 2) Directing toward a clearly defined objective, 3) Seizing the offensive initiative, 4) Striking an unprepared enemy, 5) Using only minimum strength against other efforts, 6) Exploit you own flexibility versus the opponents inabilities 7) Promote you own unity of command, 8) Never letting the enemy have any advantage, and finally 9) Good communication keeping all plans simple and having consistency.

Those familiar with our military know the importance of field manuals and regulations. Here, FMs and ARs serve our Army in its conduct and actions, for good or for bad.

I remembered when the Secretary of the Army talked at the Chicago Civil War Round Table at the Union League, where slides of an Army Staff Ride showing off Gettysburg to the Russian counterpart. No doubt, a similar staff ride of Borodoino, the great Napoleonic battle fought before the gates of Moscow in 1812, would be equally deconstructed, finding valuable lessons to be learned.

Tonight, we will use such a Staff Ride in literary and narrative sense to explore The Battle Cold Harbor, seeking meaning of the 1864 Overland Campaign staged by General Ulysses S. Grant against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia led by General Robert E. Lee.

On the Union side, the Order of Battle, recent causalities and enlistments coming due, would change the complexion. Heavy Artillery units were pulled from their garrison duty and sent forward to Grant. These green troops will affect the outcome, learning the art of war the hard way.

Pulling out of the North Anna River wedge, moving east and crossing the Pamunkey River along with the Totopotomoy Creek and the Chickahominy River where on the Chickahominy Grant would fight the decisive battle against Lee.

“Lee’s army is really whipped.” On May 26, Grant assuring Henry Halleck, “ The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably,”

Grant used his returned cavalry under Sheridan, creating an impression that the Union Army would be moving in that direction directing west of Lee’s defenses to Little River.  

Torbert’s and Gregg divisions headed for Littlepage Bridge and Taylor’s Ford, confusing Lee even further.

On May 26, James Wilson headed out at 6:00 AM to demonstrate on Lee’s left, taking him pass Grant’s headquarters at Quarles’s Mills, stopping to talk to Grant and General John A. Rawlins, Grant’s Chief of Staff on the coming campaign.

He then continued to Jericho Mills crossing one of the pontoon bridges, and passing behind General Horatio G. Wright’s 6th Corps at Little River, finding deception in firing artillery and sending soldiers over.

Meanwhile, at Jericho Mills and Quarles Mill union baggage trains began their crossing.

II Corps movement alerted confederates that something was up. Lee immediately directed Anderson and Ewell to advance skirmishers to see what the federal forces were doing.

Lee had a footbridge built over the South Anna River for possible movement south against Grant.

Sheridan with Gregg and Torberts divisions covered the main crossing at Hanovertown supporting General D. A. Russell division of Sixth Corps. Gregg secured Littlepage Bridge. 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry control crossing at Taylor’s Ford, leading to the collision of the two opposing cavalries in the opening clashes that will be referred to as the Battle of Cold Harbor.

Lee was still reluctant to turn south, fearing Grant would swing left and head straight for Richmond. Lee would use his cavalry to see if the Union had cross into Hanover County.

In any case, Lee began moving down Telegraph Road toward Atlee Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, nine miles from Richmond, southwest of Grant’s concentration at Hanovertown, blocking the Union advance along a new line of his own selection.

By May 28th, all four corps of the Army of Potomac had crossed Pamunkey.  While, General David McMurtrie Gregg’s cavalry encountered Confederate cavalry, commanded by General Williams C. Wickham and Thomas L. Rosser, being bolstered by an untried Virginian cavalry brigade of General Mathew Calbraith Butler, at Haw’s Shop.

General Philip Sheridan in his memories stated the importance of Haw’s Shop. “Lee wished to hold this ground while he maneuvered his army to the line of the Tolopotomy, where he could cover the roads to Richmond, while Grant, though first sending out merely to discover by a strong reconnaissance the movements of the enemy, saw the value of the place to cover his new base at the White House, and also to give us possession of a direct road to Cold Harbor.”

Grant was following the first three principles of war outlined in the field manual, massing and concentrating his army, with the objective of defeating Lee before Richmond avoiding a siege similarly faced at Vicksburg.

Lee would have advantage having the inside track, and having an easier time moving his Army providing more time for rest and for preparedness to meet Grant, who has to swing wide and operate in that part of country more favorable to Lee than to Grant.

Haw’s Shop cavalry engagement for Lee indicated that the Union had cross the Pamunkey. Here, Lee deployed his army four miles east-southeast along the Totopotomoy. Here, between the Totopotomoy and Chickahominy, the next river south where Battle of Cold Harbor would be fought.
But on May 28, Hancock’s II Corps ran into enemy infantry pickets.

General Baldy Smith’s 18th Corp of the James begun their trek to White House to operate with the Army of Potomac, will reach White House on May 30th. Orders were received on June 1, hastening their present to New Castle. What remained uncertain were the working relations between General George Meade and “Baldy” Smith.

Meanwhile, a meeting on May 29th was arranged between Beauregard and Lee considering the availability of soldiers that could be spared, reminding President Jefferson Davis afterwards, “If this army is unable to resist Grant the troops under General Beauregard and in the city will be unable to defend it.”

The dawn of May 30th saw different potentials for the two opposing armies. Lee felt he could easily hold the line along the Totopotomoy Creek, where the southern end of the line was somewhat troubling.

The Union cavalry at Old Church would protect the supply lines preventing confederates interfering with Baldy Smith.

On May 30th, Hancock’s II Corps holding the Union’s center along Atlee Station Road. Wright’s 6 Corps moved down to Hanover Court House, linking up to Hancock’s northern flank with Warren 5th Corps moving across the Totopotomoy and advancing along Shady Grove Road. While, Burnside 9th Corps was to slip between    Hancock and Warren facing Confederate General Richard Anderson.

Confederate John C Breckinridge’s soldiers were completing their earthworks across Shelton farm, facing Hancock across the creek. While Hancock’s right wing under Birney was having a tough go of, where nasty little skirmishing fights would flare, killing and wounding men picketing, and completing the discomfiture.

Tension between infantry and cavalry was having infantry commanders taking matters into their own hands. Warren asked Burnside to move toward Old Church Road, which were in the hands of confederate cavalry.

Burnside seems flustered by conflicting objectives.

Warren decided to direct Griffin west along Shady Grove Road until contact with the enemy, seeking Colonel Jacob Sweitzer to conduct the reconnaissance. The confederates reluctantly retired while Griffin press westward finding the main rebel line. Warren directed Griffin to halt until Burnside appeared to his right. Captured prisoners indicated that the Confederates were entrenching half mile ahead.

June 1st found confederate divisions of Hoke and Kershaw securing New Cold Harbor and moving toward Old Cold Harbor, entrenching themselves all along their lines. It was intended that Kershaw would lead any attack, while Hoke remain behind his earth works, waiting to see what happens.

Meade senses the enemy buildup. Withdrawing Wright from the Union right he had Wright make a fifteen-mile march to Cold Harbor. Wright is unable to maintain a desired timetable, being unable to reach Cold Harbor at first light. The toil of campaigning and marching was having an effect on Wright’s troops, despite Sheridan’s messages of haste.

While Baldy Smith received a penned dispatch from Grant through Babcock directing him to New Castle moving on Wright’s right. Sensing the urgency of Babcock’s dispatch move his 18th Corps on the road to New Castle without breakfast.  Being only two miles Baldy Smith arriving only to find himself alone, not knowing where either the 5th and 6th Corps were even at. Immediately begun constructing a bridge across Pamunkey that would be needed, sending Captain Francis U. Farquhar to find Grant to determine if the instructions received were mistake. Running into Wright showing him Babcock’s dispatch, quickly dictated a note to Smith directing him to Cold Harbor.

Wright’s 6th Corps was at least an hour’s march from Cold Harbor. Baldy Smith’s 18th Corps would have further to march taking the same road as the 6th Corps, a recipe for additional slowness.

Meade’s efforts to reinforce Sheridan with infantry at Cold Harbor only showed Federal confusion. Whatever advantage, the Union had possessed was losing its ability to fight in gaining any advantage, the individual soldier was at a stress point and the command decisions were showing they were losing command of a desired outcome, violating half principles of war.

The confederate sensing an advantage pressed forward against federal cavalry holding Cold Harbor. Nonetheless, federal weaponry in terms of repeating carbines helped stay off the confederates.

Thomas Hyde of Wright’s aide rode into Old Cold Harbor around 9:00 AM indicating 6th Corps was approaching.  Wright moved to secure the road intersection, hoping Baldy Smith to fill the gap. Infantry reinforcements were welcomed, knowing they were facing at least an infantry division on the other side.

Meanwhile Grant formally placing Baldy Smith’s Corps under Meade’s command. Baldy Smith would start toward Cold Harbor as soon as Wright had passed.

Luck was held by the Union on this occasion as the delays had little consequences. The marches, nonetheless, were causing increase exhaustion.

Both Grant and Meade saw an opportunity to get into Lee’s rear, using Wright and Baldy Smith Corps ordering an attack as soon as possible, while the rest of Union forces of Hancock, Burnside, and Warren held the Totopotomoy creek.

Lee fearing the 18th Corps had possible joined Grant with the disappearance of 6th Corps on his left sent Beauregard a dispatch in Richmond of the danger now posed to move the balance of his command to the North side of the James River to have Beauregard to take command of the right wing of the army.

Beauregard could not comply since Butler had not sent his entire army and President Jefferson Davis had not decided to abandon the rail line between Richmond and Petersburg.

Lee shifted his headquarters from Shady Grove Church to the road west of New Cold Harbor, below Gaines’s millpond. The Army of Northern Virginia having its line now running northwest to southeast with Hill’s corps on the left, Early in the center, and Anderson on the right.

Sheridan’s tired troopers retired, while James H. Wilson Division was destroying bridges and railroad track north of Richmond, cutting access for the confederates to the Shenandoah Valley and Fredericksburg.

Cavalry fighting between Confederate Wade Hampton uncovered Union right, forcing Hancock advance brisk skirmishing. The cavalry Battle of Hanover Court House and Ashland mixed results for both sides. Nonetheless Wade Hampton was maturing into effective cavalry leader to replace Stuart, killed at Yellow Tavern.

It also added to the fact that the infantry and not the cavalry would determine the fate of the campaign.

Despite the shear exhaustion of the Sixth Corps along with the 18th corps in terms of marching, Grant ordered an attack. Upon arriving the 18th Corps instead securing position between the 5th and 6th corps added it numbers north of Wright.

Around 4:00 PM 6th Corps artillery began firing being joined by the 18th Corps, with confederate artillery of Kershaw and Hoke provoking a furious artillery duel.

William Brooks Division of Smith’s 18th Corps and was placed in line, extending the Union line past Beulah Church.

To ease the dilemma between Warren and Wright, Warren dispatched Lockwood’s Division, finding the task almost impossible.

While the confederates was finding similar problems as the Union lines were being extended in strengthening there own lines jockeying back and forth.

Meade placed Wright in charge of the attack, with Grant and Meade squandering an excellent opportunity. Nonetheless when all was said and done, the 18th Corps fought shoulder to shoulder with the Army of Potomac and General Ricketts himself handsomely, being praised by Meade.

Meade sent orders to both Wright and Smith resume the attack “with your whole force, and as vigorous as possible.”

On June 1st Grant saw a teamster hitting some horses stuck in mud had the teamster had tied to a tree for six hours as punishment.

After dark on June 1st Hancock’s 2nd Corps began evacuating Totopotomy Creek defense to join Wright and Smith at Cold Harbor for the planned attack the next day, with Gibbon pulling out of the line first followed by Barlow and Birney heading east along Atlee Station road. The march resembled problems encountered by Wright the previous day.

Captain William H. Paine, talented topographical engineer sent by Meade to help guide Hancock only caused undue hardship along with suffocating clouds of dust created by additional marching. Barlow being Hancock’s lead Division didn’t get to Cold Harbor at 6:00 AM on the 2nd, with rest of the Corps trailing miles back.

At this point of the campaign, it was already moving toward to a Union disaster, as the infantry was toward shear exhaustion of unnecessary confusion in marching and what was expected. The unity of command was coming unglued. The initiative and surprise was lost.

Meade’s temper with the various divisions’ commanders, denouncing both Warren and Wright, moving without orders or moving too slowly was having negative effect on any outcome.

Postponing the attack to 4 in the afternoon. But matters were no better causing the moving the attack to the daybreak of June 3rd.

The delay was working in favor for the Confederates who studying the union lines and entrenching themselves accordingly, providing lines of cross firing.

Both Meade and Grant assumed the Division Commanders were surveying the positions in front of them. Of course this wasn’t done. The rain stopped and daybreak foretold the ominous entrenchment of the Confederates

Postscript

Today, of the 7,500 acres constituting the Battlefield of Cold Harbor only 300 acres are preserved, making it to the most endanger list by the Civil War Preservation Trust, under siege for public development. Here, the battlefield overlaps the 1862 Gaines” Mill battle and impacting the authority of the Richmond National Battlefield, possible finding inclusion into the National Park System.

Through the National Park Service, Cold Harbor can be tour as Podcast, featuring the action occurring on June 1st, being the best chance for Grant’s Union Army of the Potomac had over its opponent Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by going to website www.CivilWarTravler.com. Here, Park Ranger Ed Sanders provide the narrator and tour guide.

Richmond National Battlefield Park also provides online its official newsletter, The Quarterly, keeping abreast of the latest news.

Bibliographical Note:

The literature concerning the Battle of Cold Harbor, from May 26 through June 3, 1864, is rich and often overwhelming.

The primary record for detail will always remain The Original Records known as the ORs especially Volume 36, Part 3 carries that story.

More recently Gordon C. Rhea’s book “Cold Harbor-Grant and Lee May 26-June 3, 1864,” was used as the main text for this talk. Gordon Rhea has become the outstanding historian of Grant’s 1864 campaign. We had the pleasure of hearing Rhea last March at our annual symposium.

Gene Smith has produced an excellent contrast study. Lee and Grant Smith stated “The assault on Cold Harbor was almost the only thing he regretted doing in the war, Grant came to feel. It had accomplished nothing.” Grant tried to find a means to help the wounded and recover the dead. Lee stated such arrangement was impossible, asking for an armistice-“an act of a soldier who has lost a battle.”
, supplemented by personal memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan and Ernest B. Furgurson’s “Not War But Murder.”


Grant Takes Command, original published in 1968 by Bruce Catton.

have done much to end that misunderstanding by rendering a definitive account of the voyage and trials of America's own legendary Ulysses - the man and the paradox - during his epic struggle.

Personal Memoirs of P H Sheridan, originally published in 1888